Showing posts with label managerial economics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label managerial economics. Show all posts

Utility and Risk Aversion in Investment Decision

The assumption of risk aversion is basic to many decision models in managerial economics. Because this assumption is too crucial, it is appropriate to examine attitudes toward risk and discuss why risk aversion might hold in general.

1. Possible risk attitudes

In this theory, three possible attitudes towards risk are presented as aversion to risk, indifference to risk, and preference for risk. Risk aversion characteristics individuals who seek to avoid or minimize risk. Risk neutrality characteristics decision makers focus on expected returns and disregard the dispersion returns (risk). Risk seeking characteristics decision makers prefer risk. Given a choice between more risky and less risky investments with identical expected monetary returns, a risk averter select the less risky investment and a risk seeker select the riskier investment. Faced with the same choice, the risk-neutral investor is indifferent between the two investment projects.

Given the importance of attitudes towards risk in economic decision making, it is important to ask what factors are involved in the determination of such attitudes. Managerial economics tends to presume that the majority of economic participants are risk averters, and it makes this presumption on the basis of the principle of diminishing marginal utility of money.

2. Relation between money and its utility

At the heart of risk aversion is the notion of diminishing marginal utility for money. If someone with no money receives $5000, it can satisfy his or her most immediate needs. If such a person then receives a second $5000, it will obviously be useful, but the second $5000 is not quite so necessary at the first $5000. Thus, the value or utility of the second or marginal $5000 is less than the utility of the first $5000 and so on. Consequently, diminishing marginal utility of money implies that the marginal utility of money income or wealth diminishes for additional increments of money.

Now, if this principle holds generally then it has an important implication for attitudes towards a 50/50 risk of gaining or losing a given monetary amount. This is that the extra benefit from making an equally likely gain is less than the loss of benefit from enduring an equality likely loss. For this reason, the diminishing marginal utility of money tends to make for risk aversion.

3. Adjusting the valuation model for risk

To the extent that diminishing marginal utility leads directly to risk aversion, then this risk aversion can be reflected in the basic valuation model used to determine the worth of a firm. If a managerial decision affects the firm’s risk level, the value of the firm is affected. Two primary methods are used to adjust the basic valuation model to account for decision making under conditions of uncertainty.

Under conditions of risk, the profits shown in the numerator of the valuation model as π equal the expected value of profits during each future period. This expected value is the best available estimate of the amount to be earned during any given period. However, since profits cannot be predicted with absolute precision, some variability is to be anticipated. If the firm must choose between two alternative methods of operation, one with high expected profits and high risk and another with smaller expected profits and lower risks, some technique must be available for making the alternative investments comparable. An appropriate ranking and selection of projects is possible only if each respective investment project can be adjusted for considerations of both time value of money and risk.

4. Certainty equivalent adjustment

The certainty equivalent method is an adjustment to the numerator of the basic valuation model to account for risk. Under the certainty equivalent approach, decision makers specify the certain sum that they are comparable to the expected value of a risky investment alternative. The certainty equivalent of an expected risk amount typically differs in monetary terms but not in terms of the amount of utility provided.

5. Risk-adjusted discounts rates

Another way to incorporate risk in managerial decision making is to adjust the discount rate of denominator of the basic valuation model equation (iii). Like certainty equivalent factors, risk-adjusted discount rates are based on the trade off between risk and return for individual investors.

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Risk and Uncertainty in Managerial Decision Making

Risk means a low probability of an expected outcome. From business decision-making point of view, risk refers to a situation in which a business decision is expected to yield more than one outcome and the probability of each outcome is known to the decision-makers or it can be reliably estimated. For example, if a company doubles its advertisement expenditure, there are four probable outcomes such as; 

(i) its sales may more-than-double,
(ii) they may just double,
(iii) increase in sales may be less than double and
(iv) sales do not increase at all.

The company has the knowledge of these probabilities or has estimated the probabilities of the four outcomes on the basis of its past experience as:
(i) more-than double – 20 percent (or 0.2),
(ii) almost double – 40 percent (or 0.4),
(iii) less than double – 50 percent (or 0.5) and
(iv) no increase – 10 percent (or 0.1).

It means that there is 80 percent risk in expecting more than doubling of sales, and 60 percent risk in expecting doubling of sale, and so on.

There are two approaches to estimating probabilities of outcomes of a business decision, viz.
(i) a priori approach, i.e., the approach based on deductive logic or intuition
(ii) posteriori approach, i.e., estimating the probability statistically on the basis of the past data.

In case of a priori probability, we know that when a coin is tossed, the probabilities of ‘head’ or ‘tail’ are 50/50, and when a dice is thrown, each side has 1/6 chance to be on the top. 

The posteriori assumes that the probability of an event in the past will hold in future also. The probability of outcomes of a decision can be estimated statistically by way of ‘standard deviation’ and ‘coefficient of variation’.

Uncertainty refers to a situation in which there is more than one outcome of a business decision and the probability of no outcome is known nor can it be meaningfully estimated. The unpredictability of outcome may be due to lack of reliable market information, inadequate past experience and high volatility of the market conditions. For example, if a Nepalese firm, highly concerned with population burden on the country, invents an irreversible sterility drug, the outcome regarding its success is completely unpredictable. Consider the case of insurance companies. It is possible for them to predict fairly accurately the probability of death rate of insured people, accident rate of cars and other automobiles, rate of buildings catching fire, and so on, but it is not possible to predict the death of a particular insured individual, a particular car meeting an accident or a particular house catching fire, etc.

The long-term investment decisions involve a great deal of uncertainty with unpredictable outcomes. But, in reality, investment decisions involving uncertainty have to be taken on the basis of whatever information can be collected, generated and ‘guesstimated’. For the purpose of decision-making, the uncertainty is classified as:
(a) complete ignorance and
(b) partial ignorance.

In case of complete ignorance, investment decisions are taken by the investor using their own judgment or using any of the rational criteria. What criterion he chooses depends on his attitude towards risk. The investor’s attitude towards risk may be that of:
(i) a risk averter,
(ii) a risk neutral,
(iii) a risk seeker or risk lover.

In simple words, a risk averter avoids investment in high-risk business. A risk-neutral investor takes the best possible decision on the basis of his judgment, understanding of the situation and his past experience. He does his best and leaves the rest to the market. A risk lover is one who goes by the dictum that ‘the higher the risk, the higher the gain’. Unlike other categories of investors, he prefers investment in risky business with high expected gains.

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Factors Influencing Investment Decision

There are many factors which directly or indirectly influence capital investment decisions besides the availability of funds to invest, profitability of the investment, market for the product, etc. They are discussed below.

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1. Technological Changes

Technological development changes at present is much faster than that at past. The new technology increases the productivity of labor and capital. The selection of new technology depends on the net benefit over the cost of having the technology. Benefits from and cost of new technological change also influences the investment decisions.

2. Competitors’ Strategy

If the competitors are installing new equipment to expand output or to improve quality of their products, the firm under consideration will have no alternative but to follow suit, else it will be in loss. It is, therefore, often found that the competitor’s strategy regarding capital investment plays a very significant role in forcing capital decision of a firm.

3. Demand Forecast

The long-term demand forecast is one of the determinants of investment decisions. If the firm finds market potentials for the product in the long run, the firm will have to take decisions for investment.

4. Outlook of Management

Investment decision depends on the management outlook. If the management is modern and progressive in its outlook, the innovations will be encouraged, whereas a conservative management discourages innovations. Innovations increase the output as well as profit of the firm. The modern and progressive management takes decision to invest without any hesitation.

5. Fiscal Policy

Various tax policies of the government relating the tax concession on prioritized investment, rebate on new investment, method allowing depreciation, deduction allowance etc. also have influence on the capital investment.

6. Cash Flows

Every firm makes a cash flow budget. Its analysis influences capital investment decisions. On the basis of cash flow budget, the firms plan the funds for acquiring the capital assets. The budget also shows the timing of availability of cash flows for alternative investment proposals.

7. Expected Return from the Investment

Investment decisions are mostly done in anticipation of increased return in future. So, it is necessary to estimate future net returns from the investment proposals while evaluating the investment proposals.

8. Non-economic Factors

The factors, which cannot be evaluated in monetary terms, are called non-economic factors. Sometimes the non-economic factors also influence investment decisions. Working environment in the firm, safety measures in the operation of machines, brotherhoods among employees, good relationship between employer and employees etc., influences the firm’s output and also the investment decisions.

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Two Part Tariff Pricing | Should a firm set a high entry fee and low usage fee, or vice versa?

Two part tariff refers to the practice of charging two-part prices by the producer and / or supplier of a goods or services. The term ‘tariff’ stands here for pricing. It can be defined as, “A two part tariff is one in which the consumer must pay a lump sum fee for the right to buy a product.” It is clear that under two-tariff price system, consumers pay a one-time access fee (T) for the right to buy a product, and a per-unit price (P) for each unit they consume. So, the total price for a consumer who pays both entry fee and usage fee will be,

R = T + PX

Where, X are units of product or service X consumed / demanded

A two part tariff is a price discrimination technique in which the price of a product or service is composed of two parts – a lump-sum fee as well as a per-unit charge. In general, price discrimination techniques only appear (take place) in partially or fully monopolistic markets. The main objective of using two part tariff by a firm is to capture more consumer.

A two part tariff is a strategy of price discrimination by firm to capture maximum amount of consumer surplus. The problem for the firm is how to set the entry fee (membership fee) versus the usage fee. The amount of entry fee (membership fee) charged by firms will be different depending on whether the demand is identical or different. A rational firm will set the per unit usage fee above or equal to the marginal cost of production, and below or equal to the price that a firm would charge in a perfect monopoly. Under a condition of competition, the per-unit usage price is set below marginal cost. Basically, it is required that the product or service offered by the firm be identical to all consumers so that price charged may not vary due to differences in production costs of the firm.

Assume that the firm has some market power and it is operating under monopoly. Then the question is: should it set a high entry fee and low usage fee, or vice versa? To see how a firm can solve this problem, we need to know the basic principles involved.

In order to maximize total profits, a monopolist has to charge a usage fee (or per unit price) equal to its marginal cost and initial / entry fee (or membership fee) equal to the entire consumer surplus.

Normally, the concept of two part tariff is applicable in monopoly or monopolistic or oligopoly markets. But economists also argue that two part tariffs may also exist in competitive markets when consumers are uncertain about their ultimate demand.

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Peak Load Pricing | Peak Load and Off Peak

There are certain non-storable goods, e.g. electricity, telephones, transport, security services etc., which are demanded in varying measures during the day as well as night. For example, consumption of electricity reaches its peak in day time. It is called ‘peak load’ time. It reaches its bottom in the mid-night. This is call ‘off peak’. Electricity consumption peaks in daytime because all business establishments, offices and factories come into operation. Electricity consumption decreases during nights because most business establishments are closed and household consumption falls to its basic minimum. In terai, demand for electricity peaks during summer season due to use of fans, ACs and coolers, and it declines to its minimum level during winters. Similarly, consumption of telephone services is at its peak at day time and at its bottom at nights. During Dashain festival, the demand for bus and air travel services rises to its peak in Nepal.

A technical feature of such products is that they cannot be stored. Therefore, their production has to be increased in order to meet the ‘peak load’ demand and reduced to ‘off peak’ level when demand decreases. The excess production in ‘off peak’ period could be stored and supplied during the ‘peak load’ period. But this cannot be done. Besides, given the installed capacity, their production can be increased but at an increasing marginal cost (MC).

Pricing of goods like electricity is problematic. The nature of the problem in a short run setting is depicted in the figure. The ‘peak load’ and ‘off load’ demand curves are shown by Dp and DL curves, respectively. The short run supply curve is given by the short run marginal cost curve, SMC. The problem is ‘how to price electricity?’



Peak Load Pricing of Electricity

As shown in figure, if the price of electricity is fixed in accordance with peak load demand, OP3 will be the price and if it is fixed according to off load demand, price will be OP1. If a ‘peak load’ price (OP3) is charged uniformly in all seasons, it will be unfair because consumers will be charged for what they do not consume. Besides, it may affect business activities adversely. If electricity production is a public monopoly, the government may not find it advisable to charge a uniform ‘peak load’ price.

On the other hand, if a uniform ‘off load’ price (OP1) is charged, production will fall to OQ2 and there will be acute shortage of electricity during peak hours. It leads to ‘breakdowns’ and ‘load-shedding’ during the peak load periods, which disrupt production and make life miserable. This is a regular feature in terai, the capital city of Nepal. This is because electricity rates in terai are said to be one of the lowest in the country.

Alternatively, if an average of the two prices, say P2 is charged, it will have the demerits of both ‘peak load’ and ‘off load’ prices. There will be an excess production to the extent of AB during the ‘off load’ period, which will go waste as it cannot be stored. If production is restricted to OQ1, price P2 will be unfair. And, during the ‘peak load’ period, there will be a shortage to the extent of BC, which can be produced only at an extra marginal cost of CD.

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Transfer Pricing | Transfer pricing with no external market for the intermediate product | Transfer pricing with imperfectly competitive external market

Transfer pricing is a term used to describe all aspects of inter-company pricing arrangements between related business entities, including transfers of intellectual property; transfers of tangible goods; services and loans and other financing transactions. Transfer pricing refers to the pricing of goods and services within a multi-divisional organization, particularly in regard to cross-border transactions.

In financial sector, transfer pricing is the value placed on transfers within an organization, used as a means of allocating costs to various profit centers. Transfer pricing is used widely in multi-office banks and bank holding companies, serving these important functions:
(i) price setting for services performed by business units;
(ii) a means of evaluating financial performance by business units; and
(iii) determining the contribution to net income by profit centers in the organization.

The large size firms divide their operation very often into product divisions or subsidiaries. Growing firms add new divisions or departments to the existing ones. The firms then transfer some of their activities to other divisions. The goods and services produced by the new division are used by the parent organization. In other words, the parent division buys the product of its subsidiaries. Such firms face the problem of determining an appropriate price for the product transferred from one division or subsidiary to the other. Specifically, the problem is of determining the price of a product produced by one division of the same firm. This problem becomes much more difficult when each division has a separate profit function to maximize. Pricing of infra-firm ‘transfer product’ is referred to as ‘transfer pricing’. One of the most systematic treatments of the transfer pricing technique has been provided by Hirshleifer. We will discuss here briefly his technique of transfer pricing.

a) Transfer pricing with no external market for the intermediate product


Suppose there is no external demand for intermediate product produced by a division of an enterprise or when the division producing the intermediate product can sell it only internally to another division of the enterprise. Since, we have assumed that one unit of the intermediate product is required to produce one unit of the final product, the quantity produced of the final product is equal to quantity produced of the intermediate product. The figure illustrates the determination of transfer price and output of the intermediate product and price and output of the final product when there does not exist external market for the intermediate product.

Determination of transfer price of the intermediate product with no external market

Dm is the external demand of the final product of the marketing division and MRm is the corresponding marginal revenue curve of the final product. MCm is the marginal cost of the final product processed by the marketing division and MCp is the marginal cost of intermediate product of the production division. By vertical summation of marginal cost curves MCm and MCp , we get the total marginal cost MC of the final product. In order to maximize profits, the firm (marketing division) will equate its marginal revenue (MRm) with its total marginal cost (MC) and, as will be seen from figure, its profit-maximizing point is E at which OQ level of output is produced and price Pm of the final product is set. Since by assumption, production of one unit of final product requires one unit of intermediate product, the output of the intermediate product by the production division will be equal to the output of the final product. Therefore, the amount OQ of the intermediate product will be produced.

The transfer price for the intermediate product, Pt is set equal to the marginal cost of producing OQ amount of it which is equal to QB. The transfer price Pt equal to marginal cost of production of output. OQ of the intermediate product is a right or appropriate transfer price as by adding it to marginal cost (MCm). The marketing division equates the combined marginal cost (MCp + MCm) with its marginal revenue (MRm) to maximize the overall profits of the enterprise. As seen above, this causes the top management of the enterprise to decide to produce OQ output of the final product and set price of the final product equal to PM to maximize overall profits of the enterprise.

b) Transfer pricing with external perfectly competitive market for the intermediate product


The external market in which the intermediate product is sold in perfectly competitive market with this. The division of the enterprise producing the intermediate product and facing the constant price opt prevailing in the perfectly competitive external market will equate it with its marginal cost (MCp) to maximize its profits.


Transfer Pricing with External Perfectly Competitive Market for the Intermediate Product

In the figure, price Pt is equal to marginal cost (MCp) of the production division at point E1 and, therefore, it will produce OQp of the intermediate product. This perfectly competitive price of the intermediate product is the right transfer price for the marketing division when there exists external market for the intermediate product. By adding this, transfer price Pt to the marginal cost curve (MCm) of the marketing division, we obtain the total marginal cost MC(MC= MC+ Pt). The marketing or assembling division will equate this total marginal cost MCt with MRm to maximize its profits and, as will be seen from figure, this happens at point E2 which corresponds to price Pm and output OQm.

It follows from above that of the total output Qp produced by the production division producing intermediate product, it will sell Qm units internally to the marketing division and the remaining QmQp, it will sell in the external market. In this way, the profits of each unit and the overall profits of the enterprise are maximized.

c) Transfer pricing with imperfectly competitive external market


It is assumed that the external market for intermediate product is imperfectly competitive. It may be noted that imperfectly competitive external market exists when the intermediate products are not homogeneous across firms so that the demand curve for an intermediate product is downward sloping and marginal revenue curve lies below it. Transfer pricing with imperfectly competitive external market is illustrated in figure.

In panel (b), we have drawn the demand (i.e. average revenue) and marginal revenue curves of the intermediate product of the production division of the firm in the imperfectly competitive external market. In panel (a), we have shown the net marginal revenue curve (NMR) of the intermediate product, internally by the firm’s assembling division which sells the finished product in the external market. Note that net marginal revenue (NMR) of the assembling unit of the firm which produces the finished product is obtained by deducting the transfer price of the intermediate product (which is equal to marginal cost of production (MCp) of the production division of the firm) from marginal revenue of the assembling unit (MRa). Thus, in a panel (a) NMR = MRe – MCp. If marginal cost of production (MCp) which forms the transfer price is not subtracted from MRa, of the assembling unit, we would be ignoring production division’s marginal cost of the intermediate product.

Now, in order to determine profit-maximizing output of the intermediate product, we have to sum up laterally net marginal revenue curve (NMR) of the internal assembling unit of the firm and marginal revenue curve (MRe) of the intermediate product in the external market. This has been done in panel (c) where lateral summation of NMR and MRe curves yield marginal revenue curve MRp that the production unit (MRp = NMR + MRe). It will be seen from panel (c) of figure that marginal cost of production curve MCp intersects marginal revenue curve MRp of the intermediate product and accordingly output Qp of the intermediate product is produced.

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The Prisoners’ Dilemma, an application of game theory analysis

Prisoners’ Dilemma is an application of game theory analysis in which two prisoners both confess to a crime to avoid harsher punishment when not confessing would avoid any punishment. The dilemma emerges because both prisoners are faced with the same choice – confess or not confess – but the outcome of their choice depends on the choice made by the other prisoner.

Unfortunately neither prisoner knows the choice of the other. If neither confesses, then they receive no punishment. If both confess, then they receive limited punishment, such as a year in jail. However, if one confesses and the other doesn't, the confessor receives light punishment, such as six months in jail, and the non confessor receives more severe punishment, such as five years in jail. The result is that both prisoners confess.

The model of prisoner’s dilemma explains how rivals behaving selfishly act contrary to their mutual or common interest. We first explain prisoner’s dilemma with an example given originally while propounding this model.

Let us suppose two persons, A and B have been caught for committing a bank robbery. Further suppose the prosecution has no enough evidence for their committing the crime. In order to obtain confession from them, they are interrogated in two separate rooms so that they cannot communicate with each other. While interrogating each accused, the police offer to A, “If you confess to the crime (that is, cooperate with the police) while the other keeps silent (i.e. does not confess), you will be given imprisonment for only a short period, say, 1 year only but punish the other with 10 years imprisonment. If the other also confesses, both of you would be sentenced to jail for 5 years”. It may however be known that if both prisoners do not confess, each can be jailed only for two years. The choices open to each accused are presented in payoff matrix given in the table and this refers to years of imprisonment.

Prisoner’s Dilemma: Payofff Matrix
                                                   B’s Choice
                                                   Confess                    Doesn’t confess
A  ’s Choice  Confesses              B   :     5 years         B   :     10 years
                                                    A  :      5 years        A   :      1 year
                       Doesn’t Confess  B   :     1 years        B    :      2 years
                                                    A   :    10 years       A   :       2 years

It will be seen that the outcome (i.e. length of sentence to each is determined by the specific strategy, (that is, choice) adopted by each prisoner. The two strategies (choices) refer to; 
(i) confess and
(ii) does not confess.

If both B and A confess, each gets 5 years imprisonment. If one confesses, but the other does not, the one who confesses (i.e. cooperate with the police) gets a very light punishment, namely imprisonment for 1 year only and the one who doesn't confess is sentenced for 10 years imprisonment. It will be further seen from the table that if both do not confess (that is, they remain loyal and faithful to each other and do not cooperate with the police), both are sentenced to 2 years imprisonment.

Now, each prisoner faces an uncertainty regarding how the other person will behave, that is, whether or not he will confess. Though each person has to make an independent choice whether to confess or not but the outcome, i.e. payoff depends on what the other does.

Now, under these circumstances what choice will be made by the prisoners when they cannot communicate with each other and have to choose between the two alternatives independently? The model of prisoners’ dilemma suggests that both behaving selfishly and working in self-interest confess to the crime and cheat each other. Since both confess, each will get imprisonment for 5 years. Why do they make this choice and confess can be shown as under. Take B first, most probably, he would confess when he does not know how his co-accused will act. A would reason like this: If I don’t confess it is very likely that I will be imprisoned for 10 years as the other prisoner will most probably confess. If I confess, I will get 5 years imprisonment if the other one also confesses and only one year imprisonment if he does not confess.

So, in the presence of uncertainty about the other person’s choice, and behaving in self-interest, B is likely to confess. A too reasoning similarly would confess. As a result, both prisoners would be sentenced for 5 years, though they would have received a lighter sentence of only two years if they had not confessed and remained loyal to each other. However, it is self-interest which leads each prisoner to confess and prevents them from attaining the best solution for themselves (2 years imprisonment) if both do not confess to the crime and remain loyal to each other. But the decision of each prisoner in favor of confession is quite rational because each person works in self-interest and tries to make the best “best” of the “worst outcomes” in an uncertain situation.

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Nash Equilibrium or Non Cooperative Equilibrium

Nash equilibrium is a concept from Game theory which establishes that a set of strategies followed by economic agents within a game is in equilibrium if, holding the strategies of all other economic agents are constant, no economic agent can obtain a higher pay-off by choosing a different strategy. For example, when firms operate within an oligopoly, once Nash equilibrium has been reached, none of them will want to change their strategy because by doing it, they cannot obtain a higher profit. In other words, a Nash equilibrium is a solution in which no player can improve his/her pay-off given the other’s strategy. In other words, each player’s strategy is a best response against the other player’s strategy, that is given player A’s strategy, player B can do no better, and given B’s strategy, A can do no better. The Nash equilibrium is also sometimes called the non cooperative equilibrium because each party chooses that strategy which is best for itself, without collusion or cooperation and without regard for the welfare of society or any other party. 

In the solution concept of Nash, each player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the other players, and no player has anything to gain by changing only his or her own strategy unilaterally. If each player has chosen a strategy and no player can benefit by changing his or her strategy while the other players keep their unchanged, then the current set of strategy choices and the corresponding pay-offs constitute a Nash equilibrium.

According to the Nash theorem, every game with a finite number of players and a finite number of strategies will have at least one Nash equilibrium. For this to hold, however, there has to be the possibility of some random elements to strategies. A Nash Equilibrium is a set of mixed strategies for finite, non-cooperative games between two or more players whereby no player can improve his or her pay-off by changing their strategy. Each player’s strategy is an ‘optimal’ response based on the anticipated rational strategy of the other players in the game. 

The theory of Nash equilibrium has two components:
(i) the players act in accordance with the theory of rational choice, given their beliefs about the other players’ actions (i.e., the player makes rational decision-making in the absence of cooperation), and
(ii) these beliefs are correct. If every player / participant knows the game he / she is playing and faces incentives that correspond to the preferences of the player whose role he / she is taking, then difference / deviation between the observed outcome and a Nash equilibrium can be blamed on a failure of one or both of these two components. 

If a Nash equilibrium is established by any means whatsoever, no firm (player) has an incentive to exit / move from it by changing its own behavior. It is self-policing. It is self-policing in the sense that there is no need for group behavior to enforce it. Each firm has self-interest to continue (keep up) it because any move that it can make on its own will not improve its profits, given what other firms are currently doing. 

The Nash equilibrium can be illustrated by making some modifications in the pay-off-matrix given in the table. Now we assume that action and counter-action of advertising (Ad) between Firms A and B. It is a regular phenomenon and the pay-off matrix that appears finally is given in table. The only change in the modified pay-off matrix is that neither Firm A nor Firm B increases its ad-expenditure, then pay-offs change from (15, 5) to (25, 5).

Pay-off Matrix of the Game 
                                                     
B’s Options 
                                                      Increase Ad        Don’t Increase 


A’s Strategy      Increase Ad          A            B            A              B 
                                                  20           10           30             0 
                         Don’t Increase    A            B            A              B 
                                                  10           15           25             5 

From the payoffs matrix, we can see that Firm A has no more dominant strategy. Its optimum decision depends now on what Firm B does. If Firm B increases its advertising-expenditure, Firm A has no option but to increase its advertisement expenditure. And, if Firm A reinforces its advertisement, Firm B will have to follow the suit. On the other hand, if Firm B does not increase its advertising-expenditure, Firm A does the best by increasing its ad-expenditure. Under these condition, the conclusion that both the firms arrive at is to increase advertising expenditure if the other firm does so, and ‘don’t increase’, if the competitor ‘does not increase’. In the ultimate analysis, however, both the firms will decide to increase the ad-expenditure.

The reason is that if none of the firms increases advertisement, Firm A gains more in terms of increase in its sales ($ 25 million only). And, if firm B increases advertisement expenditure, its sales increase by $ 10 million. Therefore, Firm B would do best to increase its ad-expenditure. In that case, Firm A will have no option but to increase its ad-expenditure. Thus, the final conclusion that emerges is that both the firms will go for advertisement war. In that case, each firm finds that it is doing the best given what the rival firm in doing. This is the Nash equilibrium.

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Payoff Matrix in Game Theory

Game theory summarizes in a tabular way the possible choices available to firms in oligopoly. Game theory applied to oligopoly uses a table that indicates the profit of each firm given the choice of strategy chosen by each. All possible strategies are represented in the table, and so all possible outcomes can be considered at once. This table is called a payoff matrix. The profits listed in the payoff matrix represent / exemplify underlying cost and demand information.

Suppose again that there are two firms. For simplicity, suppose that price and costs are all taken as given and that the only decision for these two firms is how much to spend on advertising and both engage in high levels of advertising, neither will enjoy particularly high profits. If neither firm advertises at a high level, each will keep its respective market share, but both will make larger profits. However, if one advertises while the other does not then the firm that advertises will gain market share and get big increase in profits while the other incurs losses. Assume that advertising might increase on holding the firm’s share of the market but it has little effect in expanding total industry sales. Finally, assume that firms reveal their strategies simultaneously and do not change them. Although it is quite simple, this model contains monetary features of the recognized interdependence of oligopolists.

The model is depicted in the payoff matrix in table.

Payoff Matrix

Firm A’s strategy
High Level of Advertising                                   Low Level of Advertising
High Level of Advertising   X gets $ 5,000      A gets $ 2,000
                                         Y gets $ 5,000      B gets $ 2,000

Low Level of Advertising   X gets $ 2,000     A gets $ 10,000
                                         Y gets $ 20,000   B gets $ 10,000

Both firms choose high levels of advertising. They then earn profits $ 5,000 each. If both adopt low levels of advertising, they each enjoy profits $ 10,000. But of one firm advertises much and the other little, the firm with the high level of advertising earns profits of $ 20,000 and the other firm losses $ 2,000.

Now put yourself in the place of the Manager of firm B, the choice of B firm will depend precisely on what you think from A will do. If you think firm A will try to do you in, then you will assume that if you try to get the $ 10,000 profit available by going for a low level of advertising, Firm A will choose a high level of advertising in self-protection. This strategy assumes you of at least $ 5, 000.

Firm A has exactly the same choices, and so if Firm A assumes that firm B is not be trusted. Firm A also chooses a high level if advertising for his self-preservation. Thus, the conservative maximum strategy leads both firms to high levels of advertising. As a result, each gets a $ 5,000 profit.

Only of the firms cooperated can earn the $ 10,000. Profits that is available to each. If firm B assumes that firm A is a profit maximizing firm with managers who behave rationally, then firm B concludes that firm A will adopt a low level of advertising. If firm A makes the same assumption about firm B then each attains profits of $ 10,000.

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